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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the effect of financial analyst coverage on audit efforts by examining the 
association between the number of analyst followings and audit hours. Existing literatures report 
that there are inconsistent results between analyst coverage and audit efforts, and most studies 
used audit fee as a proxy for audit efforts. However, audit fee may cause measurement error. We 
consider that audit hour is a better proxy for measuring audit efforts than audit fee because 
practically auditors are less likely to charge extra audit fee for their additional efforts in 
competitive audit market. Also, after audit engagement contract, the amount of audit fee is almost 
fixed. Thus, it cannot reflect variable auditors’ decision whether inputting additional efforts or not 
during audit service. Intuitively, audit hours are more accurate measure of audit efforts as long as 
it indicates how much hours auditors work. For the above reasons, we use unique dataset of audit 
hours in Korea. We find that analyst coverage is positively associated with audit hour. This means 
auditors make more efforts on their audit service in case of greater analyst following, and they 
crucially consider reputational damage from audit failure when they provide audit services to 
their clients with great analyst following. Next, we still observe the positive relation in both pre 
and post global financial crisis periods. Lastly, we find that BIG4 auditors are more concerned 
about reputational loss than Non-Big4 in case of greater analyst following.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper investigates the impact of analyst coverage on audit hours using Korean data. Sell side 
analysts, we usually called “analysts”, play a role of information intermediaries or information 
providers in the financial market (Yoo et al., 2013). They roundly collect enormous financial 
information from corporate insiders or managers, and subsequently disseminate their processed financial 
information to current and prospective investors. In other words, they are both financial information users and 
financial information providers.  
 
Analysts also evaluate firm value and recommend potential profitable firms to investors. For the firm 
evaluation, they do perform risk analysis for their target companies. We think that analysts may consider the audit 
risk as a risk factor for their evaluation, and consider that analyst coverage may affect to auditors’ audit efforts to 
reduce audit risk. Therefore, we test the relation between analyst coverage and auditors’ audit efforts empirically in 
this study.  
 
Previous studies investigate how analyst coverage effect on audit fee. Especially, Yim (2012) investigates 
the association between analyst coverage and audit efforts using international data (sample of audit hours from total 
31 countries). The study reports that analyst coverage could reduce audit fees. Greater analyst following brings 
better information environment and leads more transparency of firms’ accounting data. Then, auditor can save their 
efforts from their clients which became more transparent by the effect of analyst coverage. Therefore, prior 
literatures find that there is a negative association between analyst coverage and audit fee in U.S. or China. This 
argument supports that analyst coverage plays a role of corporate governance to constrain manager’s opportunistic 
earnings management behavior (Gotti et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2012).  
T 
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In contrast, the other side of researchers argue that there is a positive relation between analyst coverage and 
audit fees due to the possibility of reputation damage (Keune and Johnstone, 2011). Generally, the companies with 
greater analysts following receive much higher interests from voluminous investors. The investors also can collect 
the companies’ financial information easily from the analysts. In this circumstance, the auditors who work for the 
companies with greater analysts may provide more effort on their audit service. Because if they do wrong or make 
some mistakes during their audit service, they have more chance to face reputational damage by suing or blaming 
from the investors. To put it simply, the auditors will be under much higher pressure on their audit service when 
they work for the clients with many watching eyes. This argues that auditors consider the influence of analyst 
coverage during their audit service.  
 
As we explained above, the results of the association between analyst coverage and audit fee are still 
inconsistent. Add to the prior studies, we use audit hours as a proxy for the audit efforts instead of audit fee in this 
study. Audit fee may be a noisy indicator of audit risk and lack of control for audit efforts (O’Keefe et al., 1994). 
Practically, it is difficult that auditors charge extra audit fee as much as they make efforts on their audit service after 
audit engagement contract. Therefore, audit fee may not reflect the actual amount of audit efforts in highly 
competitive audit market. Furthermore, abnormally high audit fees may be an indication of poor audit quality since 
economic interdependencies between auditors and their clients may impair auditor’s independence (Choi et al., 
2006; 2008). Intuitively, we believe that audit hours are more accurate measure of audit efforts as long as it indicates 
how much hours auditors work.  
 
Korea provides a good research setting to examine the association between analyst coverage and audit 
efforts because firms in Korea are required to disclose audit hours to the public.
1
 Especially, Korean government has 
strengthened auditors’ legal liability to protect minority shareholders after the promulgation of the new Securities 
Law in 2000, and therefore, the possibility of auditors’ reputation damage and litigation risk are amplified since.2 
Therefore, Korea setting fits to investigate the effect of analyst coverage on audit efforts under strong minority 
shareholders protection law. In this setting, we test whether auditors adjust their audit efforts by analyst coverage. 
To our knowledge, there is no study has been done with the association between analyst coverage and audit hours.
3
 
Therefore, this is an open empirical question. 
 
Using 2,173 Korean firm-year observations during 2002 to 2010 period, we find that analyst coverage is 
positively associated with audit hours on average. Results of all model specifications demonstrate that analyst 
coverage constitutes incremental explanatory power to existing audit hours models. It shows that as analyst coverage 
increases, companies’ perceived risk environment is altered to be more transparent, and therefore auditors decide to 
input more audit efforts to the company. We investigate how auditors perceive the company’s business risks which 
can bring reputational damage in the pre and post global financial crisis period (Xu et al., 2011; Yim et al., 2012). 
We find a positive association between analyst coverage and audit hours in both periods. Further, we find that the 
relation between analyst coverage and audit hour is stronger in the BIG4 auditors than Non-Big4. This implies that 
Big4 auditors are more concerned about their reputational damage than Non BIG4 auditors.  
 
The remainder of our paper is as follows. Section Two briefly reviews prior studies and develops our 
hypotheses. Section Three describes our research method and sample. Section Four presents our empirical findings. 
Finally, Section Five is the conclusion.  
 
  
                                                 
1 Caramanis and Lennox (2008) use a unique database of audit hours in Greece to investigate the association between audit effort and accrual 
earnings management. 
2 As an example of the minority shareholder protection law in Korea, minority shareholders of Daewoo Electronics claimed the responsibility of 
audit failing to the external auditors of Daewoo Electronics in 2000. It was the largest indemnification case of that external auditor makes 
reparation to minority shareholders for the sake of poor auditing in Korea. 
3 Yim et al. (2012) uses the international data including 74 firm-year observations in Korea and proxies audit efforts as audit fee instead of audit 
hours. 
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2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Prior Literatures 
 
Analysts play a pivotal role as information intermediaries between companies and shareholders (Chou and 
Shiah-Rou, 2010; Yoo et al., 2013). They analyze publicly available data what companies provide, including 
financial statements, earnings data and other announcements, and they disseminate their analyzed financial 
information to the public. Previous researches have already shown that analysts have significant influence on 
investor behavior (Graham et al., 2005). Analysts often interact with management directly during earnings release by 
conference calls. Also, they have a number of channels to express their concern about covered firms through the 
research reports, or through the mass media such as newspapers and TVs. However, there is little study has been 
done regarding analyst coverage and audit properties. When analyst coverage can give an influence on auditors’ 
information environment directly, how auditors perceive the analysts’ activity is a fundamental empirical question. 
Prior studies investigate how analyst coverage effect on audit properties by using audit fees as a proxy for audit 
efforts to reduce audit risk
4
. However, their results are mixed; both positive and negative relations between analyst 
coverage and audit fees are reported.  
 
Analyst coverage improves companies’ disclosure level and promotes a better information environment. 
Haw et al. (2012) argue that firms with more analyst coverage have lesser information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, and that this reduces adverse selection problems when issuing equities. Thus, the information 
environment theory supports that analyst coverage reduces audit fees; auditors can save their audit efforts from 
improved information environments by more analyst coverage. Dyck et al. (2006) find that analysts help discovering 
corporate frauds directly. Thus, as analyst coverage increases, a company’s fraud risk decreases. This implies that 
there is a negative relation between analyst coverage and audit fees. Yu (2008) finds that analysts are capable and 
resourceful in tracking firms regularly, and they continuously scrutinize management behavior and financial 
reporting irregularities. Gotti et al. (2011) suggest that the existence of a negative relationship between analyst 
coverage and audit fees using U.S. data from 2000 to 2007. The study supports analysts’ monitoring hypothesis that 
analysts are one of external corporate governance mechanism to monitor managers’ earnings management.  
 
On the other hand, there can be a positive association between analyst coverage and audit fee. First, role of 
analysts as an independent source of monitoring mechanism can be questionable in some situations. He et al. (2011) 
argue that analyst coverage increases the public attention to the covered companies from other analysts, media and 
many investors. The possibility of audit failure being detected could be an important factor that auditors consider in 
assessing the expected costs of the clients’ risk. As a result, auditors would incur higher costs from reputational 
damage if they provide unsatisfactory audit service for firms with greater analyst coverage than for firms with lesser 
analyst coverage. Yim et al. (2012) suggest that analyst coverage is positively associated with audit fees in especially 
in Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan and U.S.
5
 Therefore, greater analyst coverage amplifies auditors’ perceived risks, 
and thus auditors ask more audit fees to the companies with greater analyst coverage.
6
 To sum up the above 
discussion, the positive association between analyst coverage and audit fees is also conceivable.  
 
Most prior studies use audit fee data as a proxy of audit efforts due to the unavailability of large datasets of 
audit hours. In this study, we collect audit hours data of Korea and test the association between analyst coverage and 
audit hours.  
  
                                                 
4 Audit risk is the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated (Bell et al., 
2005). Generally Accepted Auditing Standards indicate that auditors need to use their judgment for assessing audit risks, to decide extent of audit 
procedures, and to perform auditing procedures for reducing audit risk to an acceptable level (PCAOB, AU Section 322). 
5 The main difference between Yim et al. (2012) and Gotti et al. (2012) is that sample of Gotti et al. (2012) was limited to firms that were covered 
by at least one analyst. Yim et al. (2012) include firms that are not followed by analysts to reflect the effect of analyst coverage on audit fees. 
6 Auditors should modify audit programs for each engagement in response to changes in audit risk. Auditors are required to do so by regulation 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) and they should do so for themselves. This is because audit failures sometimes arising from 
unresponsiveness to changes in risk can be costly such as reputation damage. 
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2.2. Hypotheses Development  
 
The association between analyst coverage and audit fees is inconsistent. (Gotti et al., 2012; Yim et al., 2012; 
Haw et al., 2012). It can be negative which is due to better information environment under greater analysts 
following, analysts’ ability of discovering corporate frauds or of reducing earnings management (Lang and 
Lundlhome, 1996; Dick et al., 2007; Yu, 2008). On the other hand, it can be positive which is due to auditors’ 
concern about reputation damage and litigation risk (Lev, 1995; Keune and Johnstone, 2011).  
 
Contrary to audit fee studies, there is little study has been done with analyst coverage on audit hour due to 
unavailability of large dataset. Audit hours can be more accurate measure to capture auditors’ actual audit efforts than 
audit fees because audit fees can be affected by non audit service, auditor independence, or audit fee agreement at 
initial audit engagement. In this paper, we investigate the association between analyst coverage and audit hour using 
Korean large audit hours dataset. Korean government has strengthened auditors’ legal liability to protect minority 
shareholders after the promulgation of the new Securities Law in 2000, and thus analysts potentially generate an 
environment that more strongly affects the auditors’ judgment how much audit effort should be required. In this 
circumstance, auditors will consider the influence of the extent of analyst following when they make the judgment. 
Further, there is no study has been done with analyst coverage and audit hours in emerging countries such as Korea. 
We believe that this is an open empirical question whether analyst coverage can affect on the audit hours model.  
 
Thus, it is hard to discern the exact direction of the association between analyst following and audit fee in 
Korean stock market. Hence, the first hypothesis is non-directional as follows: 
 
H1: Analyst Coverage is on average associated with audit hours. 
 
We argue that auditors respond to analyst coverage because analyst coverage can be a link between audit 
failure and higher possibility of potential reputation damage. Given that BIG4 auditors are more concerned with 
reputation damage compared with their Non-BIG4 auditors. We predict that a positive association between analyst 
coverage and audit hour is more pronounced in BIG4 auditors. Specifically, all things being equal, for firms with 
BIG4 auditors, the effect of analyst coverage on audit hour is relatively stronger to compare with the effect for firms 
with NON-BIG4 auditors. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows.  
 
H2: The positive relation between the analyst coverage and audit hours is more pronounced in BIG4 auditors. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Analyst Coverage 
 
Analyst Coverage is measured as the number of analysts who issued a forecast of a firm’s earnings in any 
given year. We use a residual value from analyst coverage from Yu (2008). Analyst coverage is associated with 
factors such as firm size, past performance, growth, external financing activities, and volatility of business 
(Bhushan, 1989; Yu, 2008). The specific model is as follows.  
 
ANALt = β0 + β1LNMVt + β2ROAt + β3LOSSt + β4ISSUEt + β5RECORRt+ β6ROESTDt +  
Industry Dummies + ε  Equation (1) 
 
Where 
 
LNMV: Natural log of market value of equity. 
ROA: Return on assets. 
LOSS: Indicator variables of loss. 
ISSUE: Indicator variable for equity or debt issuance. 
RECORR: Correlation between firm return and market return (Bhushan, 1989). 
ROESTD: Standard deviation of return on equity. 
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In above equation, we use the residual value of equation as “residual analyst coverage”, and we use it as a 
supplementary proxy for analyst coverage. The “residual analyst coverage” is uncorrelated with firm size, past 
performance, growth, external financing, or volatility of business. Therefore, we use the number of analyst coverage 
and the residual analyst coverage in this study.  
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
LAHt = β0 + β1ANALt (Residual ANALt) + β2LNSIZEt-1 + β3BIG4t-1 + β4CONt-1 + β5INVERCt-1 +β6LIQt-1  
+ β7ROAt-1 + β8LOSSt-1 + β9FIRSTt-1 +β10ISSUEt-1 +β11LEVt-1 + Year Dummies + ε  Equation (2) 
 
Where 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
 LAH: Natural log of audit hours. 
 
3.2.2 Key variables 
 
 ANAL: Number of analyst coverage. 
 Residual ANAL: Residual Value from Equation (1). 
 
3.2.3Control Variables 
 
 LNSIZE: Natural log of the total assets. 
 BIG4: A dummy variable, one if auditor is one of Big4, and zero otherwise. 
 CON: A dummy variable, one if the firm makes consolidated financial statement, and zero  
 
3.2.4 Otherwise 
 
 INVERC: Inventory plus receivables divided by total assets.  
 LIQ: Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
 ROA: Return on Assets.  
 LOSS: Indicator variables of loss. 
 FIRST: A dummy variable, one if an audit is a first year audit, and zero otherwise. 
 ISSUE: Indicator variable for equity or debt issuance. 
 LEV: Leverage, Liabilities scaled by total assets. 
 Year Dummy: Year dummy variables. 
 
Various proxies are included for audit hour model that are known to affect the audit efforts. The control 
variables used in this research is similar to those used in other prior literatures (Reynold et al., 2004; Rhee et al., 
2012). The specific variable explanation is as follows.  
 
(a) Natural log of audit hour (LAH): In this paper, dependent variable is natural log of audit hour as a proxy for 
the external auditors’ audit efforts.  
(b) Number of analyst coverage (ANAL): Our independent variable can be number of analyst coverage. We 
expect non-directional association between Anal and LAH. 
(c) Natural log of total assets (LNSIZE): We include the client size variable based on O’Keefe et al. (1994). 
They provide the evidence that size of audit is one of the most important factors of audit hour. We expect 
positive association between LNSIZE and LAH. 
(d) BIG4 auditors (BIG4): We include the BIG4 dummy variable because BIG4 auditors are more likely to 
reduce the magnitude of abnormal accruals by spending more audit hours (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). 
We expect positive association between BIG4 and LAH.  
(e) Consolidated financial statement (CON): We include audit complexity measure such as consolidated 
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financial statement. Auditors input more hours to make complex consolidated financial statement. We 
expect positive association between CON and LAH. 
(f) Inventory and receivables ratio (INVERC): Inventory or receivables ratio is the sum of inventory and 
receivables divided by total assets. INVERC is involved as an audit complexity measure. We expect 
positive association between INVERC and LAH. 
(g) Quick ratio (LIQ): Quick ratio represents short term solvency ratio. We expect negative association 
between LIQ and LAH. 
(h) Return on assets (ROA): We also involve return on assets in this paper. When there is good financial 
condition, manager’s willingness to conduct material misstatement is reduced. Then auditors need less 
audit hour to detect material misstatement. We expect negative association between ROA and LAH. 
(i) Loss indicators (LOSS): Loss is closely related to audit risk which financial difficulty is associated with 
manager’s earnings management. We expect positive association between LOSS and LAH. 
(j) First audit engagement (FIRST): The initial audit engagement variable is included in our regression model 
because new auditors are more likely to work more hours because they should spend more time to 
understand the business of new client. We expect positive association between First and LAH. 
(k) Stock and debt issuance (ISSUE): Stock or debt issuance is closely related to potential litigation costs or 
higher monitoring costs. Auditors put more efforts with higher litigation costs. We expect positive 
association between ISSUE and LAH. 
(l) Leverage (LEV): Simunic (1980) suggests that leverage can be the important determinant for the audit 
resources. We included the leverage variables because auditors are more likely to spend more audit hours 
for risky clients (Ashbaugh et al., 2003). We expect positive association between LEV and LAH. 
(m) Year Dummy: Year dummy variables are included to control for differences in audit hours across over 
years.
7
 
 
3.4 Sample Selection 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of Korean firms from 2002 to 2010. We extract accounting and 
stock return data from the Korea Information Services Value (Hereafter KisValue) database. As of April of each 
year, we select companies that satisfy the following criteria (1) financial statement data with positive book value of 
equity available on KisValue database; (2) all of the proxies are available; (3) firms in non-financial industry; (4) 
fiscal year ended December 31.This process yields final sample of 2,173 annual firm-year observations from KOSPI 
/ KOSDAQ listed companies between 2002 and 2010. Table 1 shows the sample distribution by analyst coverage 
and by year for the hypotheses tests. We present the observations by the number of analyst coverage in Panel A and 
by number of year in Panel B respectively.  
 
  
                                                 
7 In this paper, we use firm level clustering regression. Therefore, we do not need to control industry dummies in this study. 
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Table 1. Sample Distributions 
Panel A: Sample Distribution By Analyst Coverage 
Number of Analyst Number of Observations Number of Analyst Number of Observations 
1 389 14 55 
2 286 15 58 
3 197 16 55 
4 116 17 52 
5 131 18 58 
6 107 19 40 
7 93 20 23 
8 71 21 40 
9 79 22 34 
10 72 23 15 
11 42 24 9 
12 65 25 28 
13 58 Total 2,173 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution By Year 
Year Number of Observations Year Number of Observations 
2002 200 2007 247 
2003 206 2008 235 
2004 227 2009 259 
2005 262 2010 272 
2006 265 Total 2,173 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables. Due to skewness, the variables are winsorized at the 
one percent level. Mean of audit hours (median) is 2,045(1,051). Average (median) of analyst coverage is 
7.582(5.00). Other control variables show similar values statistically with prior papers (Kwon et al., 2009).  
 
This table presents the distributions of main variables used in this study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std Dev 1% 5% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95% 99% 
No. of 
Obs. 
AUDIT HOUR 2,045 3077 9 60 296 601 1,051 2,212 4550 6800 23100 2,173 
ANALCOV 7.582 6.592 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 5.000 12.000 18.000 21.000 25.000 2,173 
RECORR 0.339 0.522 -0.947 -0.666 -0.477 -0.016 0.451 0.801 0.936 0.967 0.996 2,173 
ROESTD 0.117 0.208 0.007 0.014 0.020 0.034 0.059 0.109 0.217 0.433 1.516 2,173 
LNMV 19.673 1.649 16.757 17.383 17.741 18.428 19.387 20.811 22.048 22.810 23.969 2,173 
ISSUE 0.622 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,173 
LNSIZE 20.197 1.612 17.453 17.955 18.264 18.902 19.947 21.318 22.482 23.229 24.291 2,173 
BIG4 0.737 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,173 
CON 0.717 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,173 
INVERC 0.275 0.145 0.017 0.061 0.100 0.169 0.258 0.369 0.472 0.543 0.684 2,173 
LIQ 1.971 1.768 0.245 0.536 0.680 0.960 1.410 2.249 3.814 5.559 10.641 2,173 
ROA 0.058 0.068 -0.235 -0.047 0.001 0.026 0.058 0.096 0.135 0.163 0.229 2,173 
LOSS 0.097 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,173 
FIRST 0.162 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,173 
LEV 0.435 0.184 0.073 0.142 0.184 0.290 0.444 0.573 0.677 0.726 0.845 2,173 
Notes) AUDIT HOUR: Audit hour. ANALCOV: Number of analysts following. RECORR: Correlation between firm return and market 
return (Bhushan, 1989). ROESTD: Standard deviation of return on equity. LNMV: Natural log of market capitalization. ISSUE: Indicator 
variable for equity or debt issuance. LNSIZE: Natural log of total assets. BIG4: Indicator variable if auditor belongs to big4 auditor 0 
otherwise. CON: Indicator variable that equals to 1 if auditor makes consolidated financial statement 0 otherwise. INVERC: Inventory 
and Account receivables ratio. LIQ: Current ratio. ROA: Return on assets. FIRST: A dummy variable, 1 if an audit is a first year audit, 
and 0 otherwise. LEV: Debt ratio.  
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4.2. Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 gives the Pearson correlations are reported separately for the first stage and second stage regression 
model. In Panel A, Our dependent Variables Natural log of audit hour (LNHOUR) is positively (+) associated with 
ANAL, LNSIZE, BIG4, CON, ISSUE, and LEV while it is negatively (-) associated with INVERC, LIQ, and LOSS. 
ANAL of an independent variable is positively (+) associated with LNSIZE, BIG4, CON, ROA, ISSUE, and LEV, but 
it is negatively INVERC, LIQ, and LOSS. In addition, in Panel B, number of analyst following is positively (+) 
associated with LNMV, ROA, and ISSUE, but it is negatively (-) associated with LOSS and ROESTD. Natural log of 
audit hour is significantly associated with control variables. However, the implication of the univariate result is 
limited. Therefore, we perform multivariate regression analyses to examine the overall association between analyst 
coverage and audit hour with control variables. The result of multiple regression analysis is reported below.  
 
This table presents Pearson correlations between key variables for the pooled sample. Please see note of 
Table 2 for the explanations of variables except for the followings. Bold numbers indicate the significance level at 5 
percent levels or better (two-tailed).  
 
Table 3. Pair-wise Correlations between Key Variables 
Panel A 
 
LHOUR ANAL LNSIZE BIG CON INVERC LIQ ROA LOSS FIRST ISSUE 
ANAL 0.40 
          
LNSIZE 0.60 0.65 
         
BIG4 0.37 0.27 0.36 
        
CON 0.32 0.31 0.48 0.18 
       
INVERC -0.20 -0.32 -0.36 -0.13 -0.23 
      
LIQ -0.19 -0.19 -0.39 -0.19 -0.24 0.06 
     
ROA 0.01 0.09 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 0.28 
    
LOSS -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.65 
   
FIRST 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 
  
ISSUE 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.14 0.08 0.02 
 
LEV 0.17 0.12 0.38 0.14 0.18 0.07 -0.70 -0.40 0.20 0.02 0.28 
No. of Obs. 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 
 
Panel B 
 
ANALCOV LNMV LOSS ROA ISSUE ROESTD 
LNMV 0.72 
     
LOSS -0.09 -0.11 
    
ROA 0.09 0.08 -0.30 
   
ISSUE 0.16 0.18 -0.20 0.20 
  
ROESTD -0.08 -0.06 0.20 -0.19 0.04 
 
RECORR 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.00 
No. of Obs. 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 2,173 
 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the result from the overall association between analyst coverage and audit hours. 
Following Peterson (2009), this paper uses firm level clustering regression to remove the effects of the cross-
sectional correlation in error terms inherent to panel data. The purpose of the Model 1 is to observe the association 
between analyst coverage and audit hours without considering other factors that might be correlated with analyst 
coverage in determining audit hours
8
. In this test, analyst coverage is positively associated with audit hours (t-
value=14.911). Model 2 shows that the analyst coverage is positively associated with audit hours including control 
variables (t-value = 3.110). Following Yim et al. (2012), we conduct additional analyses with pre and post Global 
financial Crisis. Empirical results show that there is consistent positive association between analyst coverage and 
audit hours between pre and post global financial crisis. Therefore, there is little effect with Global financial Crisis 
with altering auditor’s audit efforts. Other control variables LNSIZE, and BIG4 is positively associated with audit 
                                                 
8 Similar empirical results are reported when we use lagged analyst coverage.  
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hours. In general, the coefficients on the control variables are in the predicted direction. Overall, in the multiple 
regression models, we confirm our conjecture that analyst coverage is a significant determinant of audit hours.  
 
This table presents the results of regressions of the analyst coverage and audit hour with a set of control 
variables. See the notes of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. t-statistics, reported in bracket, are adjusted 
for firm level clustering to correct for serial correlation within a cluster (a firm). ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the 
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. The regression equations are as follows. 
 
Table 4.  Regression results for Analyst Coverage and Audit Hour 
Variables 
LNHOUR 
Model 1 Model 2 Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ANALCOV 0.093*** 0.015*** 0.021** 0.009** 
 
[14.911] [3.110] [2.584] [2.272] 
LNSIZE 
 
0.421*** 0.399*** 0.450*** 
  
[15.084] [10.158] [17.692] 
BIG4 
 
0.379*** 0.438*** 0.273*** 
  
[6.068] [4.731] [5.066] 
CON 
 
0.125* 0.160 0.076 
  
[1.894] [1.632] [1.319] 
INVERC 
 
0.002 0.011 0.059 
  
[0.012] [0.037] [0.323] 
LIG 
 
0.014 0.036 -0.013 
  
[0.746] [1.290] [-0.971] 
ROA 
 
0.545 1.110 -0.271 
  
[1.102] [1.303] [-0.690] 
LOSS 
 
0.101 0.098 0.118* 
  
[1.295] [0.714] [1.709] 
FIRST 
 
-0.013 -0.026 -0.002 
  
[-0.290] [-0.293] [-0.080] 
ISSUE 
 
-0.065 -0.135* 0.013 
  
[-1.368] [-1.753] [0.355] 
LEV 
 
0.078 0.458 -0.435** 
  
[0.316] [1.220] [-2.447] 
Constant 3.844*** -4.282*** -4.143*** -1.984*** 
 
[26.942] [-7.937] [-5.491] [-3.923] 
Year Dummy Included 
N. of Obs. 2,173 2,173 1,160 1,013 
R-squared 0.479 0.653 0.597 0.758 
 
Table 5 shows that the association between analyst coverage and audit hours are altered toward presence of 
Big4 auditors. To test the association, we divided our whole sample into two groups; Big4 and Non-BIG4. Empirical 
results show that the relation between analyst coverage and audit hours is significantly positive in Big4 sample only. 
This implies that Big4 auditors are more concerned about potential litigation risk arising from analyst coverage 
which is closely correlated with the amount of disclosure level. In Non Big4 sample, analyst coverage is positive but 
insignificantly associated with audit hours. This means that non-big4 auditors consider less about their reputation 
damage from the effect of greater analyst coverage. This finding suggests that Big4 auditors input more audit efforts 
in response to greater analyst coverage with disclosure level increasing.  
 
This table presents the results of separation regressions of the analyst coverage and audit hour with a set of 
control variables. See the notes of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. t-statistics, reported in bracket, are 
adjusted for firm level clustering to correct for serial correlation within a cluster (a firm). ***, **, * indicate, 
respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. The regression equations are as follows. 
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Table 5. Separation Regression results for Analyst Coverage and Audit Hour by BIG4 auditors 
Variables 
LNHOUR 
BIG4 NON-BIG4 
ANALCOV 0.016*** 0.002 
 
[3.426] [0.122] 
LNSIZE 0.418*** 0.442*** 
 
[14.224] [6.651] 
CON 0.163** 0.066 
 
[2.067] [0.630] 
INVERC -0.015 0.118 
 
[-0.069] [0.370] 
LIG -0.009 0.032 
 
[-0.376] [1.065] 
ROA -0.074 1.984* 
 
[-0.137] [1.913] 
LOSS 0.067 0.124 
 
[0.752] [0.753] 
FIRST -0.040 0.078 
 
[-0.921] [0.606] 
ISSUE -0.024 -0.190* 
 
[-0.464] [-1.834] 
LEV -0.125 0.342 
 
[-0.452] [0.792] 
Constant -1.693*** -2.276* 
 
[-2.908] [-1.761] 
Year Dummy Included 
N. of Obs. 1,602 571 
R-squared 0.613 0.543 
 
Following Yu (2008), we conduct additional empirical analyses to deal with the endogeneity problem. For 
controlling the endoeneity problem, we use “residual analyst coverage” as the supplementary proxy for analyst 
coverage. Analyst coverage is associated with many factors, such as firm size, past performance, and volatility of 
business. Some of those factors could also affect firm’s audit hours. To control of those factors, we use the residual 
analyst coverage and use it as the supplementary proxy for analyst coverage. Additional analyses show that residual 
analyst coverage is also positively associated with audit hours including control variables. As noted in Table 6, there 
is a consistent empirical result that residual analyst coverage is positively associated with audit hours as same as the 
result from Table 5. This additional test result with residual analyst coverage also supports the argument of that Big4 
auditors are more concerned about analyst coverage then increase audit hours.
9
 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of the residual analyst coverage and audit hour with a set of 
control variables. See the notes of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. t-statistics, reported in bracket, are 
adjusted for firm level clustering to correct for serial correlation within a cluster (a firm). ***, **, * indicate, 
respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level or better. The regression equations are as follows. 
 
  
                                                 
9 We do not examine the effect of the change of analyst coverage on the change of the audit hours because analyst coverage usually does not 
undergo significant change every year. For this reason, Yim et al. (2012) do not examine change analysis toward analyst coverage on the audit 
fees. 
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Table 6. Regression results for Residual Analyst Coverage and Audit Hour 
Variables 
ANALCOV LNHOUR 
Model 1 Model 2 BIG4 NON-BIG4 
Residual ANAL 
 
0.013*** 0.014*** 0.004 
  
[2.642] [2.725] [0.318] 
LNSIZE 
 
0.465*** 0.467*** 0.450*** 
  
[18.385] [17.319] [6.471] 
BIG4 
 
0.387*** 
  
  
[6.249] 
  
CON 
 
0.122* 0.162** 0.064 
  
[1.840] [2.047] [0.602] 
INVERC 
 
-0.010 -0.040 0.130 
  
[-0.052] [-0.180] [0.408] 
LIG 
 
0.013 -0.009 0.033 
  
[0.715] [-0.384] [1.096] 
ROA 8.262*** 0.854* 0.271 2.012** 
 
[3.277] [1.738] [0.502] [2.016] 
LOSS 0.923** 0.125 0.093 0.128 
 
[2.023] [1.607] [1.035] [0.768] 
FIRST 
 
-0.014 -0.040 0.076 
  
[-0.315] [-0.926] [0.591] 
ISSUE 0.374 -0.055 -0.014 -0.187* 
 
[1.538] [-1.161] [-0.262] [-1.799] 
LEV 
 
0.010 -0.203 0.330 
  
[0.041] [-0.730] [0.770] 
LNMV 3.153*** 
   
 
[30.308] 
   
RECORR 0.533** 
   
 
[2.047] 
   
ROESTD -1.579** 
   
 
[-2.287] 
   
Constant -50.916*** -5.011*** -2.502*** -2.413* 
 
[-27.111] [-10.037] [-4.509] [-1.779] 
Year Dummy Included 
N. of Obs. 2,173 2,173 1,602 571 
R-squared 0.625 0.652 0.612 0.543 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study explores two important questions: whether analyst coverage can affect on audit hours and 
whether Big4 auditor is more concerning analyst coverage by changing audit efforts. Regarding the first question, 
we find a positive association between analyst coverage and audit hours, suggesting that analyst coverage makes a 
significant influence to auditors to input more their efforts by increasing audit hours due to the incremental chance 
of reputation damage from the audit failure of their clients with greater analyst following. As we expected, BIG4 
auditors are more concerned about analyst coverage, and they input more audit hours than Non Big4 auditors.  
 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that our findings may have following caveats. First, there may be other 
omitted factors which bias our empirical results. In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results 
largely depend on measurement criteria or time period. Second, our firm-year observations are constrained by the 
availability of analyst coverage data, and thereby it may contain a bias that our sample is toward relatively large 
firms. Therefore, it is challenging to say that our results can be generalized into a broader set of firms.  
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Despite these caveats, this study contributes to the accounting literatures by documenting that analyst 
coverage can be one of determinants of audit hours and that analyst coverage can make a significant influence to 
audit efforts. Specifically, our empirical results can help academics and stock market practitioners to understand the 
auditors’ responses on the extent of analyst coverage and the role of financial analysts in capital market. We believe 
that this study may shed some light on regarding accounting or audit issues.  
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